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Grounds for Asylum: How Victims' Rights Laws Confer
Particular Social Group Status to Domestic Violence Victims
Jordan Cotleur1
I.
INTRODUCTION
Eliza,2 a native of El Salvador, is seeking asylum in the
United States. She sought refuge by swimming across the Rio
Grande River with her six-year-old son and two nephews. I first met
Eliza while preparing for her credible fear interview, where the
government decides whether she has a reasonable prima facie case
that makes it plausible she could be granted asylum. Eliza insisted
she left El Salvador because of firsthand gang violence and
extortion. Knowing that anti-gang political opinion does not fare
well in U.S. asylum cases, I pressed Eliza to tell me more about her
life in El Salvador. When I offered to call home, Eliza became
incredibly emotional. It became clear that, like many married
women in El Salvador, Eliza was most fearful of returning home
because of the violence she would suffer at the hands of her exhusband.
Despite an uptake in legislation criminalizing domestic
violence since the 1990’s, women in Latin America still face the
highest rates of gender-based and domestic violence of any region
in the world.3 In Central America, two-thirds of female homicide
victims are killed because of their status as a woman (also known as
“femicide”) and half of women face this fate at the hands of a current
or former partner.4 The violence perpetuates at such an alarming rate
1
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because investigations into gender-based violence are nearly nonexistent in the region.5 In 2016, it was reported that up to ninetyeight percent of cases involving femicide and violence against
women and girls in Latin America went unpunished.6
Despite the prevalence of gender-based persecution, or
maybe in spite of it, in 2018, Attorney General Jeff Sessions
(“Sessions”) explicitly held that victims of domestic violence do not
qualify for asylum because they are not considered to be members
of a “particular social group.”7 Despite Sessions’ ruling in Matter of
A-B-, the question of whether or not victims of domestic violence
constitute members of a particular social group for purposes of
asylum continues to invoke legal debate. This article attempts to
navigate domestic violence’s place in asylum law by comparing the
emergence and scope of victims’ rights laws to that of asylum law.
The language, structure, and scope of victims’ rights laws in the
United States and international legal institutions support the idea
that “[v]ictims of crime and victims of human rights abuses are
recognized in this instrument as sharing similar needs and requiring
similar protections.”8
International norms now acknowledge that victims’ rights
are considered human rights.9 Based on the intersection of human
rights and victims’ rights movements, I posit that victims’ rights
laws are a quintessential consideration in determining whether a
class of people constitutes a particular social group. Victims’ rights
laws themselves offer the requisite clarity, visibility and
particularity needed to validate domestic violence victims as
members of a particular social group.
Part II of this article will define domestic violence and
asylum in the United States, focusing on what groups qualify as a
“particular social group” and how courts have responded to the
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narrow definition articulated in Matter of A-B-. Part III explores the
victims’ rights movement by defining victims’ rights law, analyzing
how they emerged, and discussing what these laws look like across
international, regional, and national platforms. Drawing on ways
that victims’ rights laws emerged and normalized, Part IV identifies
how the existence of victims’ rights laws is a sufficient basis for
granting domestic violence victims “particular social group” status.
This analysis explores both the normative similarities between
asylum and victims’ rights, as well as legal requirements of social
distinction, particularity, and immutability necessary to establish
membership in a particular social group. Additionally, Part V will
address some of the counterarguments that arise from this
discussion.
II.

BACKGROUND
A. Defining Domestic Violence

The National Domestic Violence Hotline defines domestic
violence as “a pattern of behaviors used by one partner to maintain
power and control over another partner in an intimate
relationship.”10 The criminalization of domestic violence is a
relatively modern policy in the United States that emerged in the
1970’s, and it remains non-existent as a criminal matter in many
countries around the world.11 Victims of domestic violence have
historically faced difficulty obtaining protection from the criminal
legal system because it was long viewed as a “private family
matter.”12 Unsurprisingly, Sessions relies on the categorization of
this type of crime as “private criminal activity” to justify his ruling
10
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in Matter of A-B-.13 Indeed, the private nature of domestic violence
makes it significantly more dangerous and difficult to escape than
stranger-based private criminal activity because victims and
offenders often “occupy the same space, share and compete for
resources, and have emotional ties,” and the threats of violence are
“real, immediate, and ongoing.”14
Definitions of domestic violence have also changed over the
years and continue to vary between countries and even within
different jurisdictions in the United States. States impose different
restrictions on what type of abuse, i.e. emotional, financial,
psychological, or physical, may qualify as domestic violence, and
states also require varying degrees of evidence to bring charges.15
Immigration, however, is regulated by the federal government so,
for purposes of this article, the federal definition is relevant and
controlling. The federal government defines domestic violence as “a
pattern of behaviors used by one partner to maintain power and
control over another partner in an intimate relationship.”16 The
federal government recognizes qualifying behaviors as those carried
out through physical, sexual, emotional, economic, and/or
psychological abuse, and/or threats, stalking, and cyberstalking.17
Victims of domestic violence can include spouses, intimate partners,
family members, children, and cohabitants.18 In reaching this
comprehensive definition, the U.S. government has developed
various governmental agencies and federal legislation to address the
dangers domestic violence poses to individuals and society at large.
The U.S. Department of Justice has an Office on Violence Against
Women (OVW) which leads the national effort to reduce violence
against women and “administer justice for and strengthen services
13
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to victims.”19 In 1994, Congress passed the Violence Against
Women Act (“VAWA”) making certain domestic violence offenses
a federal crime.20 Additionally, VAWA provides undocumented
immigrants who are the victims of domestic violence in the United
States a path to apply for legal permanent residency, or a “green
card.”21 While this provision signifies an attempt to provide
comprehensive coverage to domestic violence victims, many have
found shortcomings in the bifurcation that is based on whether the
abuse occurred inside or outside the United States.
“Intimate partner violence” is the United Nations’ preferred
terminology for domestic violence, and it is defined by the World
Health Organization as “behavior by an intimate partner or expartner that causes physical, sexual or psychological harm,
including physical aggression, sexual coercion, psychological abuse
and controlling behaviors.”22 Albeit discrepancies in the details of
what type of behavior may be considered “controlling,” most
jurisdictions recognize domestic violence broadly as an abuse of
power, beyond just physical aggression, that exists within an
intimate or formerly intimate relationship. Further, gender-neutral
language such as “partner” and “spouse” supports the widely
accepted fact that domestic violence is perpetuated by men and
women, and that it occurs across both homosexual and heterosexual
relationships.23 Although this article specifically focuses on
domestic violence perpetrated against women, this is not intended
to discount or minimize the experiences of male victims of domestic
violence. Rather, this distinction is necessary to underscore the
societal norms that make women inherently vulnerable to domestic
violence because of their status as women.
19
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B. Defining Asylum
Per the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services
(USCIS), asylum status is available to individuals who (1) meet the
definition of a refugee, (2) are already in the United States, and (3)
are seeking admission at a port of entry.24 For all intents and
purposes, an asylee is a refugee who is already in the United States.
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) defines a refugee as
someone who is unwilling or unable to return to their home country
based on fear of past persecution or a well-founded fear of future
persecution on account of “race, religion, nationality, membership
in a particular social group, or political opinion.”25 Four of the
protected classes (race, religion, nationality and political opinion)
are relatively identifiable and do not require substantial litigation to
define them. “Membership in a particular social group,” on the other
hand, serves as a “catch all” for other immutable characteristics that
do not fit neatly into one of the other categories. “Particular social
group” is thus, the crux upon which domestic violence victims’
claims for asylum rely. Notably, “[t]he INA does not define
‘persecution on account of. . . membership in a particular social
group.’”26
A progeny of disheveled cases led Sessions in Matter of AB- to articulate a standard for what an applicant must demonstrate to
establish persecution on account of membership in a particular
social group.27 The respondent in Matter of A-B- is an El Salvadoran
woman who sought asylum in the United States as a member of the
particular social group “El Salvadoran women who are unable to
leave their domestic relationships where they have children in
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common.”28 A-B- fled her home in El Salvador after years of
physical, emotional, and sexual abuse at the hands of her exhusband, whom she could not escape from even after securing a
divorce.29 In reaching his decision, Sessions reiterated that an
applicant must show that the requisite group is “composed of
members who share a common immutable characteristic, defined
with particularity, and socially distinct within the society in
question.”30 Despite the addition of the particularity and social
distinction requirements, Sessions did not relinquish the assertion
that a shared characteristic could be “an innate one such as sex,
color, or kindship ties. . . or it might be a shared past experience.”31
However, Sessions did assert that “a particular social group must
‘exist independently’ of the harm asserted in an application for
asylum. . . ”32 The remaining guidelines promulgated by this
decision seem to simply reiterate fundamental provisions of the
INA, such as the fact that applicants must demonstrate that
membership in the group is a central reason for the persecution, and
that when the alleged persecutor is unaffiliated with the government,
the applicant must show that her home government is unwilling or
unable to protect her.33
Prior to Sessions’ decision, Matter of A-R-C-G- was the
seminal case governing domestic violence as grounds for asylum.
There, the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) held “‘married
women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship’ can
constitute a cognizable social group” for purposes of being granted
asylum in the U.S.34 Sessions explicitly overruled Matter of A-R-CG-, finding that victims of domestic violence do not qualify as
members of a particular social group.35
28
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While Matter of A-B- arguably offered some clarity on what
constitutes a “particular social group,” it may have done so in an
unconstitutional manner. In the relatively short time since Matter of
A-B- was handed down, there has been little in the way of
substantive case law discussing its implications. The most notable
discussion of A-B- takes place in the D.C. District Court decision of
Grace v. Whitaker, which theoretically abrogated Matter of A-B-.36
Although Grace challenges the application of Matter of A-B- to the
credible fear stage of proceedings rather than the asylum context,
the decision nevertheless provides some insight into how courts may
apply Matter of A-B- going forward.37
Grace, a native of Guatemala, fled her country after having
been raped, beaten, and threatened for over two years by her
domestic partner.38 Grace’s children were also subject to beatings,
sexual assault, and death threats by her persecuting partner.39 Like
many women in her position, Grace had no protection in the
authorities in her country as they worked in concert with her
persecutor to evict her from her home when she sought help.40 While
Grace was the named plaintiff, there were a total of twelve plaintiffs,
adults and children, with painfully similar experiences.41
According to the court in Grace, “[a] general rule that
effectively bars [] claims based on the category of abusers (i.e.
domestic abusers or gang members). . . is inconsistent with
Congress’ intent to bring the United States refugee law into
conformance with the [Refugee Protocol].”42 The Court found that
a categorical ban on domestic violence claims at the credible fear
stage is “arbitrary and capricious” and “contrary to the
individualized analysis required by the INA.”43 Although the
36
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holding in Grace is only binding over the credible fear stage, the
decision nevertheless provides over one hundred pages of legal
criticism of the decision in A-B-, which likely will be taken note of
by federal courts going forward. Moreover, the credible fear stage
functions to give individuals with potential asylum claims a chance
to remain in the United States to fight their asylum claims. This
decision effectively allows asylum-seekers with domestic violence
claims to “pass” the credible fear stage, indicating that there must
be some chance for such claims to be viable in an actual asylum case
down the road.
III.

VICTIMS’ RIGHTS LAWS

Victims’ rights laws provide tangible legal rights to victims of
crime. Domestic violence victims have both implicit and explicit
rights embedded in victims’ rights law.44 While the purpose of this
article is to analyze the scope of victims’ rights laws afforded
specifically to victims of domestic violence, it is necessary to first
analyze the movement as a whole to understand the purpose, scope,
and clarity of the victims’ rights laws afforded specifically to
domestic violence victims.
A. Historical Emergence of International Norms
Victims’ rights laws emerged in tandem with the human
rights movement and the international norms governing refugees
and asylees. Moreover, victims’ rights laws reflect a domestic and
international movement to better understand the victim as a “person
with interests and needs beyond restitution.”45 Such laws emerged,
in part, to prevent cases from falling into impunity where the state
has failed, “either by commission or by omission,” to adequately
prosecute the crime.46
44
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A historical dive into this movement reveals that the victims’
rights movement and the human rights movement are far from
mutually exclusive. The widespread trauma brought to light by the
Second World War is credited with triggering the expansion of both
victims’ rights and human rights’ laws.47 In the second half of the
twentieth century, the world saw a need to protect victims from evil
acts committed, or at the very least ignored, by state actors. The
result was an international human rights movement focused on
liberalism and state compliance with international human rights
laws, supplemented by a victims’ rights movement to normalize the
recognition and protection of victims.48
The Second World War brought state facilitated persecution
on the basis of race, religion, and nationality. In the wake of these
atrocities, international agreements were quickly adopted to address
the globalized outrage, including the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (“UDHR”) in 1948 and the Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees in 1951.49 The UDHR was the first legislation
of its kind to recognize the human right to be free from various
capacities of victimhood. The fundamental overlap between the two
aforementioned international agreements supports the conclusion
that victims’ rights emerged from an effort to protect those
populations that were the intended beneficiaries of international
asylum and refugee laws. Today the umbrella of the international
victims’ rights movement encompasses the facets of the women’s
rights movement that are fighting injustices such as domestic
violence.50
Although the victims’ rights movement has moved
simultaneously with human rights movements since the 1950’s, it
finally landed on international codification in 1985 through the
47
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enactment of the UN Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for
Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power (hereafter, Basic
Principles).51 The Basic Principles’ broad interpretation of what
constitutes a victim underscores the fact that victims of crime and
victims of human rights abuses by the state “shar[e] similar needs
and requir[e] similar protections.”52 The United Nations has adopted
multiple measures since 1985 to further expand victims’ rights.53
The practical applicability of these norms is evident when one
compares the absence of participatory rights for victims at the
International Criminal Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda in the
mid 1990’s to the 2002 Rome Statute, which allows victims to
actively participate in criminal proceedings through independent
legal representation at the International Criminal Court.54
International law categorizes victims’ rights laws into
protection rights, reparation rights, and participation rights, each of
which may vary in scope and implementation across and within
different jurisdictions.55 The next two sections will explore the
specific intricacies of how the victims’ rights movement has
developed in the United States and Latin America.
B. U.S. Victims’ Rights Laws
The United States has seemingly embraced the victims’
rights movement since the beginning of the twenty-first century. In
2004, the federal government adopted the Crime Victims’ Rights
Act (“CVRA”) which articulates a standard set of rights for federal
51
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crime victims
including access to information, protection, and
participation in the criminal justice process.56 But by 2004, VAWA,
the victims’ rights measure specifically for domestic violence
victims, had already been in effect for nearly ten years.57 VAWA
grants federal domestic violence victims the right (a) to be treated
with fairness and with respect for the victim’s dignity and privacy;
(b) to be reasonably protected from the accused offender; (c) to be
notified of court proceedings; (d) to be present at all public court
proceedings; (e) to confer with the attorney for the Government in
the case; (f) to seek restitution; and (g) to obtain information about
the conviction, sentencing, imprisonment, and release of the
offender.58 All states and the District of Columbia have a statutory
provision that provides rights and protection for victims of domestic
violence, and many states have provisions that are nearly
synonymous with the federal statute.59
Notably, most state victims’ rights laws include a provision
denoting victims as having the right to protection in criminal
proceedings. This caveat will serve as an important distinction in the
analysis of how domestic violence victims are a sufficiently
particularized social group.
Many states are currently working to expand victims’ rights
laws even further through the implementation of “Marsy’s
Law.”60The law’s mission is to pass “constitutionally guaranteed
crime victims’ rights.”61 Marsy’s Law is named after Marsalee
(Marsy) Ann Nicholas, who was stalked and killed by her exboyfriend in 1983.62 On the day of Marsy’s funeral, her mother was
Crime Victims’ Rights Act, 18 U.S.C. §3771 (2004).
VAWA, supra note 20.
58
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confronted at the supermarket by the murderer.63 As they received
no notification from the justice system, Marsy’s family had no idea
that her murderer had been released on bail just days after her
murder.64 From this experience, Marsy’s family became advocates
for victims’ rights, championing the comprehensive Marsy’s Law in
states across the nation. Currently, Marsy’s Law is in the works in
seven states “with more on the horizon.”65 While the
constitutionality of Marsy’s Law remains to be litigated, the effort
itself is indicative of the value that Americans see in protecting
victims’ rights, specifically for domestic violence victims.
C. Victims’ Rights Laws in Latin America
Despite “weakening democratic institutions, increasing
violence, and eroding rule of law,” the victims’ rights movement has
had a surprising impact in Latin America.66 In 1994, states adopted
the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and
Eradication of Violence Against Women (“Convention of Belém do
Pará”) in a monumental move to generate greater state responsibility
for violence against women in Latin America and the Caribbean.67
As of 2019, the Convention of Belém do Pará has been adopted and
ratified by nearly every Latin American and Caribbean State, with
Cuba being the only exception.68 The Convention of Belém do Pará
calls on states to “condemn all forms of violence against women and
agree to adopt. . . policies to prevent, punish and end the mentioned
worth noting that, although Marsy’s law is a bill for crime victims generally,
Marsy was the victim of domestic violence as she was killed by a former
intimate partner.
63
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violence. . .”69 A number of Latin American countries have
attempted to bring themselves into compliance with their obligations
by adopting “private prosecution” measures.70 The right to private
prosecution is a criminal procedure right granted to victims which
essentially allows the victim’s lawyer to intervene during the
hearings and trial and challenge the prosecutor when he or she is
acting against the interests of the victim.71
In her book, “Prosecutorial Accountability and Victims’
Rights in Latin America,” Verónica Michel theorizes that while
victims of crime or victims of state abuse continue to deal with
perpetrator impunity in many Latin American countries, the unique
statutory right to “private prosecution” in this region provides a
“legal opportunity structure” for crime victims to assert their
rights.72 Private prosecution allows the victim to actively participate
in the criminal prosecution, “either as an autonomous private
prosecutor. . . or as an auxiliary private prosecutor.”73 The definition
of a victim may vary across jurisdictions, but it is minimally defined
to broadly encompass all “person(s) directly offended by the
crime.”74 Although Latin America is one of the most dangerous
regions in the world for violence against women, fourteen out of the
seventeen countries in the region have codified “private
prosecution” and recognize victims of crime as “rights bearers.”75
The widespread statutory right to private prosecution is reflective of
the value that Latin America gives to crime victims. Therefore, even
in a region where impunity from the law is rampant, the fact that
there is even a law on the books for victims to overcome this
impunity through “self-help” measures is indicative of the power of
victims’ rights laws as an international norm.

69
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Further, a “second generation” of laws in Latin America has
materialized out of the Convention of Belém do Pará to “typify the
various forms of violence against women.”76 While accounting for
the inherent diversity among the “social group of women,” these
laws are significant because they identify and particularize the
different societal circumstances that make women vulnerable to
violence in different ways.77 These laws take into account
characteristics such as socioeconomic status, ethnicity, marital
status, age group, education, and deprivations of liberty, to name a
few, that increase the likelihood of violence when coupled with
gender.78 The second generation laws recognize that gender-based
violence is perpetuated by a variety of patriarchal norms that
subordinate women to a second-class citizenry. Moreover, the
second-generation laws increasingly emphasize the value of the
victims’ rights, particularly through comprehensive care initiatives
and access to justice.79
Finally, victims’ rights have expanded at the same time that
many Latin American countries have shifted from criminal
procedure models that are entirely inquisitorial to “mixed models”
that have some elements of both the inquisitorial and adversarial
systems.80 The inquisitorial model relies on an extensive pre-trial
inquiry by officials of the judicial system to ascertain the truth
whereas the adversarial model rests on the presumption that the
competition between the prosecution and the defense will generate
the truth. Although inquisitorial systems tend to provide greater
reparation and participation rights to victims than their adversarial
counterparts, the newly crafted “mixed models” have proven to
maintain the higher degree of victims’ rights that accompany an
inquisitorial system while also benefiting from the efficiency of the
adversarial process.81 The resulting model is European in nature,
76
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giving rise to victims’ rights laws in the region that are heavily
influenced by international legal and human rights norms.82
IV.

HOW VICTIMS’ RIGHTS LAWS CONFER
“PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP” STATUS TO
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE VICTIMS
A. Common Intent and Purpose

Asylum law is a direct result of the human rights movement,
which emerged simultaneously with the victims’ rights movement.
Accordingly, this three-dimensional intersection reflects the need
for domestic violence victims to be granted substantive asylum
protections as victims of human rights abuses who have tangible
rights. Not only were victims’ rights and human rights-inspired
asylum laws born in response to a common theme of injustice
following World War II, they were also adopted with the common
purposes of criminalizing abusers and bringing justice and
protection to victims. The United States specifically adopted asylum
laws to bring the United States’ domestic laws in line with
international standards.83 Congress enacted the Refugee Act in order
to codify the “‘national commitment to human rights and
humanitarian concerns,’ and ‘to afford a generous standard for
protection in cases of doubt.’”84 Victims’ rights laws aim to prevent
“secondary victimization,” or “any additional suffering incurred by
victims caused by the institutional response of the offense.”85
Indeed, the Refugee Act of 1980 explicitly states that the purpose is
to “respond to the urgent needs of persons subject to persecution in
their homelands, including. . . humanitarian assistance for their care
and maintenance in asylum areas.”86 With these two principal
purposes in mind, it logically follows that victims’ rights laws and
82

Id. at 48.
Grace, supra note 33, at 104.
84
Id. at 106 (citing In Re S-P-, 21 I&N Dec. 486, 492 (BIA 1998).
85
MICHEL, supra note 8, at 48.
86
The Refugee Act, 8 U.S.C. §§1101, 1157-1159, 1521 (1980).
83

16

asylum law have the same fundamental foundation and ultimate
objectives.
Moreover, the victims’ rights movement exemplifies a
societal shift in classifying domestic violence as a public concern,
like human rights violations, not just a private issue. Former U.S.
Attorney General Sessions relies on the private nature of domestic
violence, in part, to justify the decision in Matter of A-B-.87
However, the United States and many countries in Latin America
have adopted specific legislation to contradict this assertion. In Latin
America, the second-generation laws recognize that violence against
women in the private sphere is perpetuated in the public domain as
well through the pressures of armed conflict and gang-related
operations.88 In the United States, VAWA signifies an attempt by
the federal government to bring “what was [once] a private
experience into the public realm.”89 Under VAWA, domestic
violence is unequivocally recognized as a public sphere issue that
“our society will not tolerate.”90 The decision to bring the crime of
domestic violence into the public sphere parallels the move to
publicly condemn human rights violations in the international
sphere following WWII.
Where two movements are unequivocally intertwined in
origin, purpose, and intent, it generates pause in the legal sphere
when the two movements diverge in scope after decades of
conformity. In the United States, federal legislation bifurcated
asylum law and victims’ rights laws just prior to the turn of the
century. Despite the passage of VAWA in 1994, in 1996, Congress
revised portions of the original Immigration and Nationality Act
(“INA”) under the Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigrant
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Responsibility Act (“IIRAIRA”).91 The revisions, in part, sought to
deter candidates for asylum from utilizing asylum as a means of
entry into the United States.92 This policy shift was triggered in part
by growing fears of terrorism after the 1993 World Trade Center
Bombings and the increase in the number of Latin-American
immigrants fleeing civil wars in the 80’s and 90’s.93 The 1996 INA
revisions demonstrate a divergence between U.S. asylum law and
the fundamental objective of the refugee protocol. Furthermore, the
passage of VAWA exemplifies how the United States treats
domestic violence victims differently based on whether their abuse
occurred in the United States or outside the borders.94 This
distinction is at odds with international obligations to protect under
the Refugee Act and the UN Declaration of Human Rights.
Therefore, since the current trajectory of asylum law in the United
States is running contradictory to congressional intent, intense
scrutiny is necessary to ensure that such laws are accomplishing
their original purpose and objective.
B. Victims’ Rights Laws Create “Social Distinction”
Victims’ rights laws allow domestic violence victims to
satisfy the social visibility requirement for “particular social group”
because “a special protection law” tailored to the characteristics of
a particular class of individuals is the most compelling evidence that
such a class is uniquely and identifiably vulnerable.95 In Matter of
A-B-, Sessions held that asylum applicants claiming membership in
a particular social group must show, as one prerequisite, that the
group is “socially distinct within the society in question.”96 Sessions
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rejected the classification of “El Salvadoran women who are unable
to leave their domestic relationships where they have children in
common” as members of a particular social group, in part, because
this group “lack[ed] sufficient social distinction to be cognizable as
a distinct social group.”97 In reaching this conclusion, Sessions
wrongfully rejected the fact that there are laws in place in El
Salvador criminalizing domestic violence as indicative of
cognizable recognition of this group by society at large.98
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Henriquez-Rivas v.
Holder found that the BIA “misapplied its own precedent” in finding
that the group “Salvadoran witnesses who testified against gang
members” did not satisfy the social distinction requirement for
particular social group status.99 In holding, on rehearing en banc,
that Salvadoran witnesses who testified against gang members did
constitute a particular social group, the Court articulated two
important principles for social distinctiveness.100
First, the Court held that “on-sight visibility” (meaning the
common characteristic of the group must be visible to the naked eye)
is not required to establish social distinction.101 The Court reasoned,
in part, that witnesses who testify against the cartel are inherently
incentivized to stay out of public view for fear of reprisal from the
gangs.102 Furthermore, the Court noted that anti-cartel informants
might not have on-sight visibility to the public, but they would be
socially visible, “particularly to the revenge seeking cartel
members” from whom they fear persecution.103
Second, the Court pointed out the pertinence of the fact that
“Salvadoran society recognizes the unique vulnerability of people
who testify against gang members.”104 Most notably, the Court
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relies on the fact that the Salvadoran government enacted a specific
law in 2006 to protect witnesses who testify against gangs and other
violent criminal activity.105 El Salvador’s special witness protection
law provides concrete evidence that society at large viewed this
group as uniquely vulnerable and thus, they had social distinction.
The law states, “the current El Salvadoran reality evidences the
necessity that victims, witnesses and others who are involved in…
judicial proceedings. . . should be protected to avoid violations of
their rights. . .”106
Much like the testifying witness in El Salvador, the victim
of domestic violence is now recognized by most Latin American
states as a “rights bearing subject who possesses explicit rights that
are protected by statute.”107 Therefore, where a country has
domestic laws in place that go beyond just criminalizing domestic
violence to actually protect and offer substantial rights to victims,
these victims have cognizable rights that are socially distinct in the
society in which they live. As discussed in the previous section,
most countries in Latin America (with the minor exceptions of
Colombia, Peru and Uruguay) have enacted laws that protect victims
of domestic violence and theoretically give such victims access to
private prosecution.108 Therefore, under the precedent established
by Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, Matter of A-B- was wrongly decided
as it pertains to the lack of social distinctiveness that victims of
domestic violence hold in Salvadoran society.
Although addressed more thoroughly in upcoming sections,
it is necessary at this point to address the requirement that the
persecution must exist independently of the harm inflicted. To
clarify, the proposed social group is not “victims of domestic
violence,” but rather women who are inherently vulnerable to abuse
105

Id.
Decreto No. 1029/2006, Ley Especial para la Proteccion de Victimas y
Testigos [“Special Law for Victim and Witness Protection”], (May 11, 2006).
The decree provides for ordinary and extraordinary protection measures, which
include changes of identity and residence, even to foreign countries.
107
MICHEL, supra note 8, at 48.
108
Id. at 51.
106

20

at the hands of an intimate partner because of deeply embedded
societal norms. The second-generation laws in Latin America
underscore the fact that women in general are more vulnerable to
abuse because a number of social conditions exist to “exacerbate
violence against them.”109 In short, laws codifying victim rights and
protections give female domestic violence victims the social
distinction required for particular social group status because such
laws are proof that society recognizes the “unique vulnerability” of
women to suffer violence at the hands of a current or former intimate
partner.110
C. Victims’ Rights Laws Reinforce Immutability
Victims’ rights laws serve to reinforce the requirement that
applicants for asylum based on membership in a particular social
group must show that members of that group share a common
“immutable” characteristic.111 An immutable characteristic is that
which an individual cannot, or at least should not be forced to,
change.112 Gender is immutable because the characteristic of being
a woman cannot be changed.113 Many victims’ rights laws serve to
reinforce the immutability of gender and the accompanying
vulnerabilities that make women more susceptible to persecution on
account of their gender. In particular, the victims’ rights laws
criminalizing Female Genital Mutilation or Cutting (FGM/C)
underscore many of the inevitable vulnerabilities that women and
girls face. FGM/C is defined as “any partial or total removal of the
external female genitalia or any other injury of the female genital
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organs for nonmedical reasons.”114 The United States, along with
many other countries, consider FGM/C a violation of women’s
rights because of the physical and psychological trauma it produces
on women and girls.115 In 1996, the United States enacted a special
provision as part of the IIRAIRA, making it a federal crime to
perform FGM/C in the United States on girls under the age of
eighteen.116 The legislation specifically recognized that there is no
exception for performing FGM/C because of tradition or culture.117
In addition, at least thirty-five states have adopted legislation
criminalizing FGM/C.118
In 2004, the 6th Circuit granted asylum to a victim of FGM/C
based on her membership in a particular social group defined as
“young women of the Tchamba-Kunsunte tribe who have not had
FGM/C, as practiced by that tribe, and who oppose the practice.”119
In the years since Abay v. Ashcroft, many courts have declined to
follow this decision. Despite this pushback, in 2016, USCIS issued
a policy memorandum recognizing FGM/C as a potential ground for
asylum based on membership in a particular social group.120
Considering this new policy initiative, several implications come to
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mind for asylum-seeking victims of domestic violence. First, this
policy memorandum indicates a potential pattern in asylum law
whereby the federal government enacts federal legislation
criminalizing the harm (The Female Genital Mutilation Act) and
then several decades later, upon realizing the broader human rights
concerns related to that harm, the government expands the scope of
protection to refugees who have suffered that same harm (i.e., the
policy memorandum). The natural parallel that comes to mind is the
enactment of VAWA, recognizing the public and private depravity
of domestic violence. The natural progression is for the United
States to expand the scope of asylum law to protect domestic
violence victims. Likewise, the exponential growth of the victims’
rights movement through the passage of Marsy’s Law and the like
will have an inevitable impact on views of domestic violence as a
serious human rights violation.
Additionally, FGM/C laws support the idea that “women”
should be recognized as a particular social group. FGM/C in
particular is a practice of extreme discrimination that only affects
women, and therefore, victims merely belong to the particular social
group of “women.”121 While the immutability of “gender” is hardly
in dispute, the idea of conferring particular social group status to the
entire social group of “women” raises concerns about the third and
final requirement for particular social group status, which mandates
that the social group in question be defined with sufficient
“particularity.” With social distinction and immutability satisfied,
this article now turns to address the particularity requirement.
D. Victims’ Rights Laws Create “Particularity”
Victims’ rights laws encapsulate the vulnerabilities inherent
in being a woman that make women a sufficiently particularized
social group eligible for asylum. The now infamous dicta of Matter
121
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of A-B- declared that a particular social group must not be “too broad
to have definable boundaries and too narrow to have larger
significance in society.”122 While the Attorney General does not
provide clarity on how to meet this ambiguous standard, he does
assert that “[s]ocial groups defined by their vulnerability to private
criminal activity likely lack the particularity requirement” for
asylum as “broad swaths of society may be susceptible to
victimization.”123 Here, Sessions seems to indicate that domestic
violence victims do not meet the particularity requirement because
they fall within the social group of “private crime victims.”124
However, victims of domestic violence, particularly women
protected by victims’ rights laws and possessing some additional
immutable vulnerability, represent a social group beyond their status
as victims of private crime. Most notably, Sessions fails to address
the plausible argument that gender is a sufficiently particularized
social group.125 Although A-B- reiterates that “not every ‘immutable
characteristic’ is sufficiently precise to define a particular social
group,” it does not explicitly address whether gender or sex are
sufficiently precise immutable characteristics.126 It is not clear
whether this omission is because Sessions rejects the factual reality
that women can be the targets of domestic violence on account of
their gender, or because the attorney general believes that women as
a population is too broad on its face to meet this standard.
Nevertheless, the special protection needs of women and girls,
indicated by the wave of victims’ rights legislation described above,
weigh in favor of gender or sex being a sufficiently particularized
immutable characteristic.
First, victims’ rights laws are proof that women are often
persecuted because of the fact that they are women. This reality is
122
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demonstrated in the emergence of laws criminalizing “femicide,”
which is the murder of a woman or girl because of the fact that she
is a woman.127 Nearly every country in Latin America (with the
exceptions of Cuba and Haiti) has adopted legislation criminalizing
femicide.128 Therefore, Latin American culture recognizes not only
that women can be persecuted and targeted because of their gender,
but they are targeted at an alarming rate. Additionally, one need not
look beyond the rampant culture of “machismo” that permeates
Latin American culture and inspired the victims’ rights movement
in the region to accept the fact that women, particularly in Latin
American society, are the targets of persecution because of their
gender.129 “Machismo” is a culture of male dominance that
exacerbates violence against women and defines male sexual culture
in terms of dominion and control.130 In a machismo society, men
often exercise their status as the dominant figures in society through
violence against women.131 Men are then able to target women
because, as women, they lack control over their own sexuality.132
Therefore, most female victims of violence in a machismo society
are persecuted because of the fact that they are women and,
therefore, seen as lesser. It is worth noting that in Footnote 9 of
Matter of A-B-, Sessions explicitly declined to recognize the value
of “conclusory assertions of countrywide negative cultural
stereotypes” such as cultures of machismo, specifically as they
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pertain to the particularity requirement.133 Sessions criticized Matter
of A-R-C-G for basing its analysis of machismo culture on an
“unsourced partial quotation from a news article eight years ago.”134
However, the extensive research that has been conducted into
machismo culture in the years since A-R-C-G- was handed down
serves to debunk Sessions’ lack of appropriate evidence argument
on this topic.
Once it is accepted that women are often targeted because of
the fact that they are women, it becomes clear that the social group
of women is sufficiently particularized by the existence of victims’
rights laws. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) Handbook “explicitly identif[ies] ‘sex’ as an ‘innate
characteristic’ on which a social group claim might be based.”135
Moreover, UNHCR recognizes women as a “clear example of a
social subset defined by innate and immutable characteristics. . . and
who are frequently treated differently than men.”136 The argument
that “women” as a social group is not particularized enough to
constitute a cognizable social group merely reflects a lack of
understanding of the centuries of gender norms that have confined
women, particularly in Latin America, to a consistently persecuted
social group.
The second-generation laws that emerged out of the
Convention of Belém do Pará typify vulnerable classes of women
based on other immutable characteristics such as ethnicity, sexual
orientation, national origin, age group, socioeconomic status,
marital status, or disability.137 Such laws evidence society’s
understanding that even within the diverse social group of “women,”
there are distinct particularities that make most women targets for
133
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persecution based on their gender.138 Moreover, Grace v. Whitaker
reiterates that the nexus standard allows for “mixed motives” of
persecution, “so long as the one central reason for persecution is a
protected ground.”139 Therefore in the context of these secondgeneration laws which foresee the intersection of gender and other
circumstances contributing to an increased likelihood of
persecution, the asylum-seeker who was targeted because she was a
woman, albeit a poor or married woman, meets the nexus
requirement.
While this argument is often rejected as too broadly
expanding the scope of the Refugee Convention so as to impose
upon states obligations to which they did not consent, I posit that
expanding the scope of the refugee convention to include women as
a protected class is not without merit. The world has seen numerous
instances of grave human rights violations where victims were
targeted because of their race, religion or nationality, and
nevertheless the victims held the majority population in the country
or region. For example, the South African Apartheid of the 1950’s
involved country-wide persecution against black South Africans,
who held the majority population by a landslide.140 Under the
convention, the United States would not refuse the black victims of
apartheid asylum because their classification as black South
Africans was not particularized enough. For the many reasons put
forth in this section, gender is a sufficiently particularized social
group that satisfies the particularity pillar of the asylum criteria.
V.

ADDRESSING COUNTER-ARGUMENTS
A. Government Must Be “Unwilling or Unable” To
Protect
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Even where victims’ rights laws are present, governments
may still prove unwilling or unable to protect victims of domestic
violence. Where the alleged persecutor in an asylum claim is
unaffiliated with the government, the applicant must show that her
government is “unwilling or unable to protect her.”141 The applicant
cannot rely solely on the fact that the government “[has] difficulty
controlling the behavior,” but rather they must show that the
government has “a complete helplessness to protect the victim.” 142
Therefore, a fundamental flaw arises if countries have laws in place
that effectively protect domestic violence victims because then the
government may be willing and able to protect that individual. The
reality though, is that these laws, although demonstrative of
particularity and social distinction, lack the efficacy and
implementation needed to impale an otherwise viable asylum claim.
Victims of domestic violence should not be precluded from
qualifying for asylum merely because there are laws in place that
recognize them as rights bearers, where the government has proven
it is unwilling or unable to effectuate these protections.
Despite the wave of legislation that has hit Latin America in
an attempt to combat gender-based violence, enforcement of these
laws remains obsolete.143 Although there may be “legal stock”
available to citizens in Latin America to achieve justice through
private prosecution or other means, the region has nevertheless
“become known for lacking institutions that uphold the rule of law
and protect human rights.”144 Even where international, regional,
and domestic legislation is in place to champion victims’ rights,
cultural norms such as machismo pose a significant barrier to
protection, safety, justice, and enforcement for women. Author
Verónica Michel eloquently describes the balance between
widespread impunity and how having “rights on the books” still
matters in countries where enforcement is ineffective or obsolete.145
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In analyzing the role of private prosecution in Guatemala, Chile, and
Mexico, Michel never strays from the reality that these states, and
many states in Latin America, have a high degree of structural
impunity that makes access to justice for victims nearly
unattainable.146 Nevertheless, Michel posits that with the
appropriate resources and support, the existence of private
prosecution on the books is a means by which victims may have
improved access to justice.147
The uniquely intimate nature of domestic violence and the
inevitably high rates of underreporting make it difficult to determine
both the prevalence and the rates of investigation and prosecution.
Anecdotally, many women like Eliza, that I encountered at the U.S.
southern border, reported they either went to the police themselves,
or knew someone who did, and the police did not do anything to
help them. One comprehensive study of violence against women in
Latin America found that the percentage of women who reported
physical or sexual violence by a partner ranged from 17% in the
Dominican Republic up to 53.3% in Bolivia.148 The same study
conducted an analysis of women who sought help and asked women
why they did not seek help for intimate partner violence. The study
shows that the percentage of women who sought help from the
police, court, or other protection agency ranged from 6.5% in
Ecuador in 2004 to 27.1% in Jamaica in 2008/9.149 For women who
experienced intimate partner violence in the past 12 months, the
most common reasons that women gave for not seeking help
included: the belief that they could solve it on their own; belief that
help was “unnecessary” or violence was “normal”; fear of retaliation
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from their partner; shame; and lack of trust of anyone else.150
Although these numbers are not necessarily indicative of the exact
percentages of domestic violence cases that go unreported or
uninvestigated by local governments, these studies and anecdotal
experiences underscore the cultural reality of machismo that renders
government protection nonexistent. Furthermore, although thirtytwo out of thirty-three Latin American and Caribbean countries have
made a commitment to protect victims of gender-based violence
through the ratification of the Convention of Belém do Par, only two
countries have enacted specific national action plans on domestic
violence as of 2016.151 A national action plan is a policy instrument
that “seeks to regulate and operationalize merely declarative
laws.”152 In other words, national action plans give substantive
enforcement power to the existing laws that otherwise operate
merely as a means of identifying and grouping a common class of
victims.
Therefore, it is the existence of victims’ rights laws that
indicate society recognizes a certain population of people as socially
distinct and particularized, but the lack of enforcement of such laws
within the criminal justice system overcomes the argument that the
government in these countries is willing and able to protect such
social groups.
B. Particular Social Group Must Exist Independently of
the Harm Inflicted
In Matter of A-B-, Sessions found that “El Salvadoran
women who are unable to leave their domestic relationships where
they have children in common” was not a particular social group, in
part, because the particular social group “must exist independently
of the harm asserted” in the asylum application.153 Thus, crime
victims cannot define their particular social group based on the
150
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crime that has been executed against them. Sessions reasons that in
domestic violence cases, the abuser does not target his partner
because of the fact that she is a married woman unable to leave her
relationship, rather, he targets her “because of his preexisting
personal relationship with the victim.”154 This reading of domestic
violence claims neglects the fact that male abusers do in fact target
their partners because they are women and because they are trying
to reinforce the patriarchal power structure of their relationship.155
Therefore, social groups for gender-based violence need not be
defined in terms of the harm experienced. Gender alone is a
sufficiently particularized and cognizable group that is recognized
in many societies, particularly in Latin America, as a group that is
inherently vulnerable to certain acts of violence. In fact, in a rare
moment of concession, Sessions recognizes that “there may be
exceptional circumstances when victims of private criminal activity
could meet [the nexus] requirements.”156 Therefore, although
domestic violence is arguably considered “private criminal
activity,” it is also a form of persecution based on the woman’s
gender that independently meets the nexus requirement.
VI.

CONCLUSION

In the United States, intimate partner violence is responsible
for 15% of all violent crime.157 That is a staggering statistic in a
nation that purportedly values gender equality. To categorically
deny all victims of domestic violence from seeking asylum in the
United States is to deny that there is a gendered power disparity in
society which causes women to disproportionately experience
violence on account of their gender. Women face power disparities
all around the world that make them inherently vulnerable to abuse.
The World Health Organization estimates that nearly a third of all
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women worldwide who have been in a relationship have
experienced some form of intimate partner violence.158 Without
discounting the experiences of men who also experience domestic
violence at the hands of women, the fact is that women experience
such abuse at a much higher rate than men.159
The Refugee Act extends asylum protection to members of
a “particular social group” because the drafters knew they could not
predict every form of persecution that would inevitably exist in the
decades to come. In the middle of the twentieth century, domestic
corporal punishment was still recognized as socially acceptable in
many developed countries around the world. At that time, the
drafters could not have predicted that gender-based domestic
violence would lead to such widespread persecution against women.
The “particular social group” provision was designed to offer
asylum to newly emerging persecuted populations who remain
unprotected by their own government. The existence of victims’
rights laws coupled with their lack of efficacy, particularly in Latin
America, indicates that domestic violence victims are a recognized
social group that governments are unwilling and unable to protect.
Recognizing the need to analyze cases on an individual
basis, the existence of victims’ rights laws is just one of many
arguments to be made in favor of granting victims of domestic
violence particular social group status. Nevertheless, the emergence
of the victims’ rights movement and the particularity with which
such laws protect victims of domestic and gender-based violence is
an astounding testament to the social distinction, immutability, and
particularity of this social group of women who are uniquely
vulnerable to domestic abuse.
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